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Abstract 
This paper uses the literature on the likely outcomes of the use of capitation contracts in 
primary health care to critique the arrangements in the New Zealand Primary Health Care 
Strategy (NZPHCS) introduced in 2002.  The New Zealand arrangements provide significant 
challenges to achieving the desired goals of increased equity in the allocation of available 
resources according to health need, behavioural changes towards more collaborative models 
of care delivery and an increased focus upon prevention and patient wellness instead of 
instances of illness.  The single capitation instrument chosen to deliver the objectives is 
unusual in that the capitation funder does not meet the full costs of the commissioned care, 
the independent, private sector practitioners receiving capitation payments are able to charge 
the patient for any costs not met by the funder, and the capitation incentive becomes 
increasingly sharp over time as the funder selectively prioritises different population groups 
to receive greater proportions of its subsidies.   
 
The discussion concludes that the NZPHCS use of capitation is unlikely to be helpful in 
achieving the desired objectives, but is far more likely to lead to substantial increases in the 
cost of care relative to the previous system, and distortions in sector interactions that will 
result in distributional outcomes diametrically opposed to the articulated objectives.  If the 
desired behavioural changes amongst practitioners do occur, this is far more likely to be as a 
consequence of non-price mechanisms in the NZPHCS than financial incentives.   
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Introduction 
“There are many mechanisms for paying physicians; some are good and some are bad. 
The three worst are fee-for-service, capitation and salary”.             (Robinson, 2001:149)  
 
Recent years have seen the emergence of many health care policies employing risk-sharing 
tools aimed at aligning the activities of service providers with the objectives of purchasers 
and funders.  An example is managed care, where responsibility for managing all aspects of 
the financing and delivery of health care for a defined set of patients is assigned to specific 
care management entities (Robinson, 2004; Rivers and Tsai, 2003).   Whilst managed care 
models involve the use of many non-price elements (e.g. utilisation review), a common 
characteristic is some element of financial risk-sharing (‘supply-side cost-sharing’ – Ellis and 
McGuire, 1986).  
 
The agency theory rationale for supply-side cost-sharing is that by contractually linking the 
care manager’s financial returns to a proxy for the achievement of some desired 
characteristics, or by decoupling financial returns from undesirable characteristics, the desired 
activities will be pursued and the undesirable ones eschewed.  Effort exerted by the 
practitioner, which is unobserved and unobservable by the policy-maker or insurance 
purchaser setting the contract terms, will be redirected towards the pursuit of desirable, rather 
than undesirable, activities (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Robinson, 2001).  Commonly-
used supply side cost-sharing contracts are price-and-volume, partial and full capitation 
(Danzon, 1997).   
 
In a partial capitation contract, the remunerated party’s income comprises a fixed component f 
and a variable component v for each unit of output x produced at a cost c (profit = f-x(c-v)).  
In a full capitation contract (v = 0), the recipient’s income is invariant to the number of units 
of output produced. By decoupling remuneration from cost drivers, the higher is f and the 
lower is v, and the greater the recipient’s reliance upon income from capitation than upon the 
number of units of output produced.  The recipient now faces incentives to reduce costs in 
order to increase profitability – for example, producing fewer outputs or finding cheaper ways 
of producing them.  Behavioural change ensues because the undesirable behaviour is no 
longer rewarded, or because the rewards will accrue only by engaging in the desired 
behaviours.  However, if the recipient has little ability to reduce costs or cannot easily control 
the demand for outputs, then exerting effort on the desired activities will have minimal effect 
on income.   The likelihood of the desired activities being pursued is small.  Rather, the 
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recipient will invest effort instead in activities that maintain or increase income at the expense 
of the desired activities.   
 
Partial or full capitation contracts have become common in primary health care remuneration 
as they reduce the over-consumption externality of subsidised health care by financially 
penalising practitioners who deliver ‘too many’ consultations.  Capitation is the principal 
form of government-funded remuneration for England’s Primary Care Trusts (Keen, Light 
and Mays, 1999), is common in insurance-funded remuneration of primary care physicians in 
the United States (Robinson, 2004; Hagen, 1999) and is the basis of New Zealand’s partially 
tax-funded primary health care strategy (King, 2001).  They are also extensively used in 
public sector ‘outcomes-based’ (Honore, et. al, 2004) and ‘performance-based’ (Martin, 
2002) contracting.  Reduced emphasis on the consultation as the primary payment 
determinant is attributed with a shift in primary care delivery focus away from interventions 
in the event of illness towards the promotion and maintenance of wellness (Coster and 
Gribben, 1999; Cumming, 1999; Malcolm, 1997).  They are also attributed with being stimuli 
for increased equity, targeting of high health need, encouraging a team approach to primary 
health care, and a change in focus towards a care management model as opposed to a model 
of episodic intervention with a focus on illness (Crampton, Sutton and Foley, 2001).   
 
However, capitation contracts have limitations.  Robinson (2001:4) identifies that capitation is 
inferior to fee-for-service in that it does not recognise the extent of practitioner effort exerted: 
“its payment is determined prospectively without regard to the number of services provided, 
overpaying physicians who stint on care and underpaying those who provide many complex 
services”.  Capitation also performs poorly in regard to risk management, as it is “imperfectly 
adjusted for the severity of illness of each covered patient.  Even a well-adjusted capitation 
payment rate fails to compensate physicians who treat patients whose condition deteriorates, 
leading to greater utilization and cost, for reasons independent of the physician’s own 
actions” (ibid).   Howell (2007) suggests that a high dependence of practitioners’ incomes on 
unpredictable variations in individuals’ demand for services poses particular challenges for 
the use of the instrument in health care markets generally, and primary health care markets in 
particular, that are not present in many other markets.  
 
This paper uses the literature on the likely outcomes of the use of capitation contracts in 
primary health care to critique the arrangements in the New Zealand Primary Health Care 
Strategy (NZPHCS) introduced in 2002.  The New Zealand arrangements provide significant 
challenges to achieving the goals of increased equity in the allocation of available resources 
according to health need, behavioural changes towards more collaborative models of care 
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delivery and an increased focus upon prevention and patient wellness instead of instances of 
illness.  The single capitation instrument chosen to deliver the objectives is unusual in that the 
capitation funder does not meet the full costs of the commissioned care, the independent, 
private sector practitioners receiving capitation payments are able to charge the patient for 
any costs not met by the funder, and the capitation incentive becomes increasingly sharp over 
time as the funder selectively prioritises different population groups to receive greater 
proportions of its funding.  The discussion concludes that the NZPHCS use of capitation is 
unlikely to be helpful in achieving the desired objectives, but is far more likely to lead to 
substantial increases in the cost of care relative to the previous system, and distortions in 
sector interactions that will result in distributional outcomes diametrically opposed to the 
articulated objectives.  If the desired behavioural changes amongst practitioners do occur, this 
is far more likely to be as a consequence of non-price mechanisms in the NZPHCS than 
financial incentives. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section one further explores the literature on the role of 
financial risk management in health care markets, taking as its base the discussion in Howell 
(2007).  This section summarises the seven predictions made in that paper of the likely 
outcomes in health care markets when capitation contracts with over-strong capitation 
incentives are applied.  Section two then outlines the context of the New Zealand primary 
health care market, the stated NZPHCS policy objectives, and the capitation instruments 
implemented to deliver them.  Section three then critiques the New Zealand strategy.   This 
section examines the specific features of the New Zealand strategy, and then tests its specific 
and general capitation mechanisms against its objectives using the predictions made in 
Howell (2007) and outcomes observed to date.  Section four concludes.   
 
1. Capitation in Primary Care Markets 
Much of the literature on capitation contracting in health care focuses specifically on the ways 
in which the contracts deal with undesirable effects arising from the presence of insurance – 
supplier-induced demand (Zeckhauser, 1970) and over-consumption by the ‘worried well 
(Pauly, 1968).  Capitation is well-suited to this objective as it places a ‘cap’ on the number of 
consultations a practitioner will deliver (Newhouse, 1996; Danzon, 1997).  Practitioners will 
deliver no more than the number of consultations at which their profits cease to be positive 
(i.e. x=f/(c-v), noting that c includes a fair return on the practitioner’s time and investment in 
human capital).   
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The extensive use of such contracts would suggest that their use is demonstrably positive, yet 
Robinson (2001) cautions that they are less successful than fee-for-service contracts in 
incentivising practitioners to exert effort (e.g. delivering more consultations in response to 
increases in patient need) and in their management of demand uncertainty (e.g. random 
‘shocks’ such as an epidemic).  They have also been associated with changes in sector 
organisation, including the rise of ‘corporate medical care’ (both investor-owned and 
nonprofit and charity provision) with a commensurate shift away from widespread 
practitioner ownership of care delivery firms towards more practitioners becoming salaried 
employees (Dranove, Simon and White, 2002).  This has implications for sector output given 
consistent evidence that self-employed practitioners work longer hours and deliver more 
consultations than their salaried counterparts (Newhouse, 1973; RNZCGP, 2005). One 
explanation offered for this observation is a change in practitioner lifestyle aspirations in a 
profession that is rapidly ‘feminising’ (RNZCGP, 2005).  However, it is also consistent with 
observations of the sharing of over-much risk via capitation contracts, the financial 
consequences of which practitioners cannot easily control (Howell, 2007).  United States 
evidence suggests that substantial changes in practitioner behaviour have been achieved using 
incentive contracts with very low power (Ma and Riordan, 2002).  
 
If the balance between the strength of the capitation incentive and the ability of the 
practitioner to affect outcomes is ill-judged, then there might be systemic effects that 
influence both the actions of practitioner-owners investing effort to maximise profits or 
minimise losses, and the allocation of consultation numbers and quality amongst the patients 
for whose care they are responsible as a consequence of natural variations in the care 
demands of those patients.  Despite the prevalence of capitation in the sector, few papers 
explicitly discuss the systemic effects upon patients and sector structure of sharing the latter 
of these risks (known as ‘random demand risk’) with practitioners via capitation. This is 
surprising, given that United States evidence suggests that only around 20% to 25% of patient 
demand variation is predictable ex ante using characteristics such as patient age gender, 
income, ethnicity or past consumption (Newhouse, 1996).  These are the factors most 
commonly used to set incentive strengths in capitation contracts (Robinson, 2004).   
 
In addressing the gap, Howell (2007) focuses specifically on the effects in primary care 
markets.  Primary care providers are characterised by (predominantly sole) practitioner 
ownership, very low levels of financial capital (the most important asset is the human capital 
of the practitioner and other clinical and administrative staff) and therefore high susceptibility 
to the effects of financial risk-sharing.  The paper posits that health care markets differ 
fundamentally from other markets in their approach to random risk management.  Third-party 
7/26/2007 -6- 6
  
purchasers (governments, insurers) are in a position to participate in capitation contracts 
because they aggregate the financial risks of demand variation of the large number of 
individuals and manage them more efficiently than the individuals can themselves (Arrow, 
1963).   The economic justification for their existence is thus predicated upon random risk 
management.  When they share financial risk with providers via capitation contracts in order 
to reduce the costs of ‘predictable’ risk controllable by practitioners (i.e. reduction in 
supplier-induced demand), they also share the costs of the very ‘random’ risks (e.g. 
unpredictable variation in individual’s demand for health care, and exogenous shocks such as 
an epidemic) that give rise to their existence.  Health care capitation contracts therefore result 
in the fragmenting of large, more efficient third party (insurer and government) risk-bearing 
pools into very much smaller, less efficient provider-based ones.   
 
Optimal health care capitation contracts thus require the very careful balancing of the savings 
from ‘predictable’ risk reduction against the increases in cost of less efficient ‘random’ risk 
management arrangements.  Whilst trade-offs between random and predictable risk occur in 
other capitation contracts, such as the remuneration agreement between an employer and an 
employee where the effects of random events (e.g. business cycle volatility) are shared, they 
are less problematic in these circumstances as there is no other explicit agreement in the 
contractual nexus conferring explicit responsibility for the management of random factors by 
either of the parties to the capitation contract.  Howell (2007) suggests that the additional 
complexity of health care random risk-sharing arising from the explicit bundling of insurance 
and health care in capitation contracts offers a plausible answer to Robinson’s (2001) puzzle 
of why fee-for-service contracts have obdurately prevailed in health sector remuneration 
agreements, whereas incentive contracts are far more routinely observed in typical employee 
remuneration agreements.    
 
Moreover, Howell argues that, unlike hospital and specialist care, primary care is 
characterised by repeated interactions between the same patients and primary care providers 
across time that further increase exposure to random risk factors relative to other health care 
providers.  Repeated transacting results in serial correlation between unknown cost-causing 
patient characteristics not captured in the compensation agreement (e.g. unknown genetic 
predisposition in a given individual), and the financial returns of the provider managing the 
care of those patients.  Primary care is also susceptible to geographically-related demand 
correlation (e.g. localised infections) as individual providers cannot diversify their risk 
portfolios by assuming responsibility for patients in locations remote from the one in which 
their current patients reside. These factors lead to the systematic creation of habitually 
profitable (‘lucky’) practices where patient demand is lower than the population average (i.e. 
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patients are ‘healthier than average’) and therefore receive ‘windfall’ profits irrespective of 
the effort exerted, and habitually loss-making (‘unlucky’) practices where patient demand is 
higher than the population average (‘sicker than average’) and where the practitioner must 
either bear the additional costs financially (e.g. interest on loans, lower returns per hour 
worked) or exit the business.  
 
Howell (2007) concludes that unless primary care capitation contracts have quite low-strength 
financial incentives, or the pools with which the financial risk is shared are very large, the 
financial effects of sharing ‘random’ risks can quickly come to ‘crowd out’ the benefits of 
sharing ‘predictable’ risks.  This has significant effects upon the quality and quantity of care 
provided.  The willingness of providers to invest their human capital in businesses subject to 
capitation contracts, and the characteristics of the businesses they will choose to invest in, is 
thus critically dependent upon the degree of random risk shared.  If financial returns become 
over-dependent on luck, then there will necessarily be changes in incentives for practice 
ownership, changes in the nature of sector interactions, reduction in supply of services, 
inequitable allocation of care based upon patient health need and substantially higher costs of 
consultation delivery than in systems with limited financial risk-sharing.   These probable 
outcomes suggest that extreme caution is required in the use of capitation contracts let in 
primary care markets by government policymakers and private insurers.   
 
Specifically the paper proposes seven likely consequences that will arise in primary health 
care markets if the capitation incentive strength does not appropriately balance the two 
competing effects. The sharper the contract incentive (i.e. the higher is f, the lower is v), and 
the smaller the risk pools to which the capitation agreements apply, the more likely it is that 
these effects will be evident, and the greater the costs of the negative consequences to the 
sector.   
1. The systemic effect of capitation leads to sicker-than-average patient populations being 
served by loss-making practices, who must (all other things being equal) lower service 
quality in order to remain financially viable.  Thus, capitation systems by their very 
nature result in sicker-than-average individuals receiving lower-quality care than 
healthier-than-average individuals.  Capitation contracts are hence antithetic to 
equitable allocation of available resources on the basis of health need regardless of the 
capitation strength, but the degree of disparity is greater the stronger the incentive and 
the smaller the patient pools.    
2. The supply of consultations in a capitated system will be less than the number of 
consultations under a fee-for-service system remunerated at the same average 
consultation cost.  This occurs because loss-making practices facing higher-than-
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average demand must reduce consultation numbers to the capitated average in order to 
remain financially viable, whilst profit-making practices face reductions in profit if they 
provide more consultations than the number (less than the capitated average) that luck 
has allocated them, so cap output at a number less than the capitated average.   
3. Cream-skimming of patients is associated with capitation as the system requires 
providers to become insurers.  Whilst traditional cream-skimming to avoid bad risks by 
utilising private knowledge of patient health states is feasible, the mere creation of 
habitually profitable practices encourages a form of cream-skimming simply by 
abstaining from registering new patients in order to safeguard existing profits or 
mitigate potential losses.  The greater the level of uncertainty about patient health 
states, the more stable the practice patient list and the stronger the capitation incentive, 
the greater the likelihood of this strategic response occurring.   
4. Capitation contracts unequivocally raise the average cost of care delivery relative to 
fee-for-service not just by the additional costs of risk management and profits extracted 
by profitable practitioners, but also by increasing capital costs in the financial structure 
of profitable practices.  This occurs because of the capitalising of ‘luck’ into the 
‘goodwill’ of profitable practices when they are sold to second and subsequent owners.  
5. Capitation contracts inevitably lead to changes in ownership patterns in primary care 
markets due to the persistence of loss-making amongst some practices.  A bifurcation 
will occur between small, ‘lucky’ profitable practitioner-owned practices and large, 
‘unlucky’ habitually unprofitable practices run by nonprofit and charity providers, 
hiring practitioners as salaried employees.  Again, the sharper the capitation incentive 
and the smaller the initial risk pools, the more likely it is that this outcome will emerge, 
and the faster it will become evident.   
6. From finding 1, all else being equal, the bifurcation of ownership will also be 
associated with discernable quality differences.  The sicker-than-average patients of the 
large, unprofitable, nonprofit and charity providers will receive, on average, lower 
quality care (e.g. shorter consultations, longer waits for appointments) than the 
healthier-than-average patients of the small, profitable, practitioner-owned providers.   
7. Where competition exists between different remuneration forms in the market for 
practitioners, practitioners will self-select according to their willingness to work hard 
and accumulate human capital.  Hard-working practitioners of all ages seeking to be 
well-rewarded for their efforts will self-select away from capitation-remunerated 
systems.  In the long-run, capitated systems will have a disproportionately larger 
number of less hard-working practitioners with lower human capital than the systems 
into which the hard-working practitioners self-select than their ‘risk-free’ rivals.  This 
has particular ramifications for young practitioners, who seek to accumulate human 
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capital rapidly and be well-rewarded for their efforts.  Relative to a fee-for-service 
system, the capitation system with its restricted consultation numbers will extend the 
time it takes to accumulate the same amount of experience, even for those who opt to 
work as salaried employees in ‘unlucky’ practices.  In an open market for practitioners, 
capitated systems will struggle to recruit and retain hard-working early-career 
practitioners.  Those practitioners who do select into it are likely looking for less 
arduous working conditions (e.g. as a mid-career choice after working long hours in a 
fee-for-service environment) or are risk-averse and prefer working as an employee for a 
salary.  This has long-term implications for sector structure and health outcomes as well 
as the quality and quantity of care offered in each system.     
 
The paper concludes with the caution that capitated contracting of primary care appears 
indicated only where there is strong evidence of significant over-supply or where there are 
very large risk pools, and that even then the incentive should be weak given the necessarily 
higher costs of capitated systems and the very significant consequences of getting the balance 
of risk-sharing wrong and distorting sector resource allocation, investment and health state 
outcomes.  Unless these characteristics are present, it will likely be far less costly and the 
outcomes more certain when non-financial instruments are used to alter provider behaviour.   
 
2. The New Zealand Primary Care Strategy 
The New Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy (NZPHCS) was implemented in July 2002 
(King, 2001).  The stated policy objective was to realign provider behaviour to a new vision 
of how care should be delivered.   New nonprofit management entities, Primary Health 
Organisations (PHOs), were established to register patients, receive payments and enter into 
treatment provision contracts with service providers.  PHOs are charged with co-ordinating a 
range of primary health care services provided to their registered members, and replacing the 
“old, isolated ways of working” of the previous system with “new, collaborative models” 
emphasising the promotion of wellness rather than a focus on interventions for sickness 
(King, 2001:18).  There are no obligations placed upon PHOs regarding the contract forms 
used to remunerate providers.  However, their patient coverage is confined to individuals 
residing within the geographical confines of a government-owned and mandated District 
Health Board (DHBs) (of which there are twenty-one).  The relevant DHB is the entity which 
registers the PHO and, for contractual purposes, is the party disbursing government capitation 
payments to the PHO and is responsible for monitoring and enforcing the PHO’s contractual 
obligations (including having the ability to scrutinise PHO contracts with their providers and 
the prices charged by those providers, to both the PHO and patients). 
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2.1 Institutional Changes 
In practice, however, as they are new nonprofit entities with no financial reserves with which 
to manage financial risk, PHOs simply ‘pass on’ the service delivery capitation payments to 
providers under a ‘back-to-back’ contract promulgated by the Ministry of Health (MoH).  
Thus, primary care service providers, the vast majority of whom have patient pools of 
between 1200 and 2000 patients, become the entities responsible for managing demand 
variation, whilst the PHO retains responsibility for service co-ordination (Howell, 2005; 
McAvoy and Coster, 2005).  Government, via the MoH and the DHBs bears no financial risks 
of individual demand variation, although the DHBs, via their hospital services, become the 
deliverer of last resort for individuals unable to obtain community-based primary care 
(Howell, 2005).   
 
The vast majority of PHOs have derived their patient membership, and hence funding, via 
exclusive agreements with service providers.  Providers ‘supply’ the patients for whom the 
PHO receives capitation funding (separated between management fees and service delivery 
fees), and the PHO passes the care delivery portion on to the provider.   Many PHOs have 
been formed around pre-existing provider collectives, predominantly Independent Practitioner 
Associations (IPAs) (over 90% of registered individuals belong to a PHO that either 
originated from an IPA or is managed under contract by a company that had its genesis in an 
IPA - Howell, 2006a).  Patients of practitioners who do not join PHOs continue to receive 
government subsidies at the pre-2002 rates, therefore accessing none of the additional 
government funding applied to the sector since 2002.   
 
The use of nonprofit PHOs was motivated by a policy objective to “chart a course for primary 
care that draws on the experience of the community-governed non-profit sector” which was 
seen to be delivering “co-ordinated and intermeshed” services (Crampton, Davis and Lay-
Yee, 2005:235) and which, between the mid 1990s and 2002, had been funded principally on 
a capitation basis (although a small number of general practices had experimented with 
capitation) (Crampton, Sutton and Foley, 2001; Coster and Gribben, 1999).  There was also a 
strong desire to increase the range of service providers remunerated by government subsidies, 
as prior to the 1990s government primary care funds had been applied almost exclusively to 
services provided by general practitioners, the majority of whom were self-employed sole 
practitioners (NHC, 2000).   
 
7/26/2007 -11- 11
  
2.2 Practitioner Organisation 
Crampton, Davis and Lay-Yee (2005) record that in the 2001/2 National Primary Medical 
Care survey, 91% of general practitioners were self-employed, and only 3% worked as 
salaried employees of nonprofit and charity providers.  Only 11.4% of the general practitioner 
workforce was remunerated by salary, including locums and those who owned practices in 
conjunction with other practitioners, but were remunerated by salary.   The authors also note 
an uneven allocation of practitioners to patients (rural areas typically exhibit shortages of 
practitioners), and concerns about the ability of the profession to continue to supply the needs 
of a growing and aging population, given that the workforce is aging and struggling to recruit 
new members in the face of many other New Zealand and international opportunities for 
medical practitioners.   
 
Practitioner surveys confirm physician supply difficulties in New Zealand (RNZCGP, 2005). 
They also confirm that full-time self-employed practitioners work 1.2 times the number of 
hours of their full-time salaried colleagues, and earn commensurately higher incomes as a 
consequence.  This supports the contention that income, practice ownership and exertion of 
effort are linked, as would be expected in a profession where return for effort exerted (i.e. 
profit) is a significant motivating factor for the majority of practitioners. 
 
2.3 Pre-NZPHCS Practitioner Payment Arrangements 
Prior to 2002, the majority of primary care practices were remunerated by fee-for-service, 
either fully patient-funded, or part government-subsidised by for some individuals based on 
age, family income and demand frequency (Ashton, 2005).  Approximately 47% of the 
population qualified for government subsidies, although not all of those eligible made use of 
them (Hefford, Crampton and Foley, 2005).   The balance of the population self-insured (i.e. 
met the total costs of primary care themselves).   By the late 1990s, government funding 
accounted for between only 30% (Austin, 2004) and 40% (King, 2001) of sector spending, 
with the balance coming from patient out-of-pocket expenditure.   
 
During the 1990s, changes in MoH funding processes enabled a number of new providers 
with different organisational forms to receive partial or full government funding for new 
service delivery models specifically targeting the needs of marginalised communities.  Many 
of these evolved in the form of consumer-owned co-operatives, such as Iwi (Maori tribal) 
health providers serving members of existing Maori groups (either family-based or in urban 
areas), and community health groups in localities (e.g. rural) where recruiting and retaining 
general practitioners was problematic (Crampton, Davis and Lay-Yee, 2005).   The widened 
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scope of the 1990s funding arrangements also enabled many IPAs to develop new service 
delivery models with alternative funding arrangements.  These included budget-holding for 
pharmaceutical and laboratory spending (Malcolm, 1997), and services increasing access for 
specific populations (e.g. WIPA in Wellington had contracts for diabetes management, 
immunisation and school-based education programmes – Howell, 2006a).  Although having 
some community representation in their governance, these services were to all practical 
purposes practitioner-governed supplier-owned co-operatives, albeit with the apparent 
absence of an overt profit motive, complementing rather than competing with, the services 
provided at general practitioner clinics (Howell, 2006a).  Whilst many of these programmes 
continue to be separately funded, their co-ordination has largely been folded into PHO 
operations.  
 
2.4  NZPHCS Funding Arrangements 
An explicit objective of the NZPHCS is to substantially increase the share of government 
spending in the sector to position New Zealand closer to comparator OECD nations (King, 
2001).  Whilst no expectation of the share of government funding at the end of the NZPHCS 
rollout has been stated, it is generally believed that the target is in the vicinity of 80%, 
consistent with the share in other OECD countries and exhibited in New Zealand’s 
predominantly government-funded secondary and tertiary sectors.  In the three years 
following the introduction of the policy, government funding for primary care increased by 
43% (Hefford, Crampton and Foley, 2005).  However, the government’s share of total 
expenditure did not increase as much as the Minister had expected given the substantial 
additional injection of government funding (King, 2004).   
 
The ability for general practitioners to charge patients directly for any difference between the 
government contribution and the costs of service provision has been enshrined in the sector 
since 1938.  This agreement was a compromise between the government of the day, that 
wished to nationalise the funding and provision of all health care, and medical practitioners, 
who wished to maintain their professional and commercial autonomy.  The compromise 
resulted in government funding and provision of hospital, mental health and maternity 
services, government subsidy of primary care, and general practitioners and specialists 
maintaining their status as independent practitioners with the right to charge patients for any 
costs not met by government contributions (Ashton, 1999).  The right to charge patients is 
unchanged by the NZPHCS.  General practitioners are still free to set their own fees to 
patients in order to fully recover costs,  albeit with the relevant PHO-registering DHB having 
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the power to review fees and refuse the right for a practitioner-contractor to a PHO to increase 
prices if the increases are deemed unreasonable (Ministry of Health, 2002; DHBNZ, 2006).    
 
In practice, consistent with the theories of monopolistic competition presumed to prevail in 
primary health care markets (Gaynor and Vogt, 2000), there has historically been a wide 
variation in practitioner fees charged to patients, both under fee-for-service and capitation.  
Fees in urban areas, where practitioner choice is large, are higher than those in provincial 
centres and rural areas where practitioner choice is much more limited (Consumer, 2005).  To 
date, only one practice has had its proposed fee increases rejected by its DHB.  Typical 
practices have been able to increase fees in the vicinity of around 4.5% per annum, nearly 
twice the compound annual inflation rate of 2.5%1, without attracting DHB fees review 
scrutiny (Cameron, 2007).   
 
2.5 The Capitation Contract 
Capitation payments are made to PHOs in three components – a management fee per head 
based on the number of individuals registered in the PHO, and treatment (GMS/Nurse) and 
access (Services to Improve Access) payments based on patient age, gender, ethnicity and 
past consumption.  The largest, payment, the GMS/Nurse payment, is ‘passed through’ via the 
‘back to back’ contract between PHOs and service providers.   
 
The capitation formula is a ‘mixed’ one, in that the government funds only part of the cost of 
care via capitation payments per individual registered (adjusted for patient age and gender, 
and by practice service area ethnicity and economic deprivation characteristics).   As per the 
1938 agreement, the shortfall is levied to patients when consuming care.   The share of 
government funding increased in a stepwise manner each year following the strategy’s 
introduction, with different groups of the population becoming eligible for higher subsidies on 
the basis of age and other patient characteristics.  The first beneficiaries were individuals aged 
over 65 and under 5, and those patients registered in PHOs where more than 50% of the 
registered individuals were in the lowest income deciles or of Maori or Polynesian ethnicity 
(“Access Practices” – the remainder are termed “Interim Practices”).  Over subsequent years, 
higher subsidies were extended to 5-14 year olds, 15-24 year olds and 45-64 year olds.  The 
final group, 26-44 year olds, will receive higher subsidies from 1 July 2007, by which stage it 
is anticipated that most differences in the funding of Access and Interim practices will be 
eliminated.   
                                                     
1 Using Statistics New Zealand’s New Zealand CPI Inflation Calculator quarter 2 2002 to quarter 1 2007 
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/0135595.html 
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Each capitation increase has been associated with political expectations that any increase in 
government payments will be directly matched by corresponding reductions in the fees 
charged by practitioners for the subsidy class receiving the more generous government 
assistance.  For example, the Prime Minister stated that the July 1 2006 capitation increases 
meant that “700,000 people aged between 45 and 64 would now pay $27 less for doctor visits 
and $3 for prescriptions – instead of $15 – if they enrolled with a primary health 
organisation”2.  Despite more groups becoming higher-capitated, there is still an expectation 
that some groups will continue to pay different patient payments based on class membership – 
for example, there is strong pressure for practitioners not to charge a fee for consultations 
delivered to children under 5 years old.  This group commands the highest capitation 
payments, but generates the greatest demand.  DHB and MoH policy material supports the 
contention that this approach to fee setting is expected for price monitoring and if necessary, 
price regulation (DHB, 2006).  
 
2.6     Motivation for Funding Reform: Equity and Access Objectives 
The policy rationale for the NZPHCS appears to be encapsulated in a paper released by the 
advisory body the National Health Committee (NHC) in December 2000, some six months 
before the announcement of the NZPHCS.   As the NZPHCS appears to adopt most of the 
NHC recommendations, it is presumed that the rationale underlying them is the justification 
in the NZPHCS.  A key theme of NHC (2000) is the recommendation to move to a 
‘population-based’ model of care delivery.  The operationalisation of ‘population-based’ care 
via ‘population-based funding’ appears to manifest itself as ‘capitation payments’ in the 
NZPHCS.   
 
Notably, NHC (2000) does not define ‘population-based funding’ – i.e. how ‘population-
based care’ will be funded.  Thus it does not address how the allocation of individuals of 
varying, unpredictable, demand propensities to the groups that will receive funding (i.e. 
allocation of ‘random’ risk) will affect the choice of remuneration method for both those 
managing the purchasing of, and those delivering, ‘population-based care’.  Neither does it 
address how population-based funding might work counterproductively for high-need 
individuals (Robinson, 2001).  It simply concludes that “capitation funding for PHC3 is more 
likely than FFS4 to encourage population-based approaches, enhance a team approach and 
                                                     
2 http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,3719646a7144,00.html 
3 primary health care 
4 fee-for-service 
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improve accountability for team-based outcomes.  While change in practice, e.g. towards a 
population-based approach may take time, at the very least capitation should lead to better 
distribution of resources towards those population groups that currently have low rates of 
primary care utilisation (and expenditure) but often have higher needs” (p25).   
 
NHC (2000) thus proposed a ‘population-based’ model of care delivery (care delivered to 
groups rather than individuals) (p16) as it was deemed to allocate both funding (p25) and 
practitioner (p13) resources more equitably and lead to greater provider co-operation and 
teamwork (p22).  However, the central role of the patient consultation was reinforced as the 
principal output of primary care: “population-based approaches do not replace but rather 
complement high quality care for individual patients” (p15).   A clear distinction was made 
between ‘universal’ (as opposed to ‘targeted’) service provision and population-based 
approaches.  
 
The justification for a move to capitation thus appears to be twofold: that patient payments in 
the pre-2002 regime, despite government subsidies being applied on the basis of family 
income, age and health need, were deemed to be creating access barriers for low-income 
individuals and individuals of specific ethnicities over-represented in the low income 
populations (Barnett and Barnett, 2004; NHC, 2000); and that the medically-based culture of 
general practice that was favoured by the historic fee-for-service payment method was 
deemed to be posing barriers to low-income individuals of non-European ethnicity with poor 
health states accessing government-subsidised care (Crampton, Davis and Lay-Yee, 2005; 
Scott, Marwick and Crampton, 2003).   
 
NHC (2000) also supports a single payment mechanism for all health care, based upon the 
government funding for secondary and tertiary (DHB) services.  The multiplicity of care 
models that had emerged over the 1990s was deemed to have led to a fragmentation of both 
funding and service provision, co-ordination problems and higher administration costs (NHC, 
2000:22).  It was also considered that multiple funding methods were sending mixed 
messages to both patients and practitioners (p21, 25).  A single delivery mechanism - 
community-based providers – was also preferred.  These providers were deemed to be better 
at addressing the requirements for practitioner co-ordination and the health care needs of at-
risk communities than either private providers or governments (Crampton, 1999; Crampton 
and Starfield, 2004), even though they had historically served only a very small percentage of 
the population.   
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NHC (2000) does not make any suggestions about how progression towards the proposed 
strategy would be managed, given the wide variety, organisation and ownership forms of 
existing providers.  An overriding characteristic of the document, along with the conspicuous 
absence of any discussion of the financial implications of its recommendations for any of the 
government, patients or service providers, is its apparent lack of distinction between the 
mechanisms for managing and allocating funding and the mechanisms for allocating and 
delivering care.  These appear to be treated synonymously, with care providers rather than 
patients being the recipients of government funding, despite the historic fee-for-service 
payments being effectively welfare benefits topping up the incomes of the targeted 
individuals consuming health care, albeit for transaction cost purposes being paid direct to 
service providers .  Funding form appears to be a simple choice between fee-for-service and 
capitation remuneration of care providers, as if by allocating the government funding on a 
population basis to care providers of the desired institutional form, improvements in equity 
would naturally ensue, even if the changes in practitioner behaviour might take some time to 
become apparent.    
 
Thus, capitation appears to have become the preferred remuneration form not because its 
specific risk-sharing features are directly aligned with achievement of the strategy’s 
objectives, but because it is deemed to pose fewer barriers to the achievement of the access 
and service delivery culture goals of ‘population-based care’ than the pre-2002 fee-for-service 
instrument.  
 
3. Critique of the NZPHCS 
The NZPHCS has introduced a universal system of capitation subsidies for which the entire 
population is eligible. The government share of sector spending has increased substantially.  
The overriding political objective appears to be a reduction in patient payments, but only for 
those individuals (and by extension, their providers) participating in the NZPHCS system.   
The allocation of heath care funds, along with a change in the locus of responsibility for 
paying for the services and changes in the identity and behaviour of the practitioners 
delivering primary care are policy priorities.  The policy is also clear about its desired 
outcomes of increased equity in access to health care.  The principal non-price instrument is 
the formation of nonprofit PHOs with some element of community governance.  The single 
financial instrument is the capitation payment, with the GMS/Nurse component being ‘passed 
through’ to service providers.  All PHOs are funded according to the same contract, even 
though they vary in size from 3,000 to 330,000 registered individuals (Howell, 2005).  Most 
primary care practices are funded via the standard ‘back-to-back’ contract. 
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As Howell (2007) identifies, all health care capitation schemes involve delegation of the 
insurance function from the capitation payer to the capitated entity.  However, the NZPHCS 
makes no acknowledgement of any insurance or financial risk-bearing implications in its 
design or implementation.  There is no distinction made between the change in locus of 
government payments from targeted ill individuals receiving welfare benefits to population-
based funding paid to risk managers (service providers) in respect of a defined population, 
irrespective of the actual demand for services.  Neither is there any distinction made between 
the patient payment pre-2002, which topped up a fee charged equally to all patients 
irrespective of subsidy class, and the NZPHCS payment, which must be contingent upon the 
demand made for services by other individuals within the same group, so necessarily includes 
payment for factors other than the provider’s time and skills.   Indeed, the NZPHCS 
arrangements result in PHOs being paid as if they are risk managers, but by passing on the 
payments to practitioners they bear no financial risk, whilst practitioners receive the 
population-based funding as de facto risk managers, but are required to charge their patients 
as if the payments they are receiving are ‘notional averaged treatment subsidies’ for patients 
of different classes, and so are presumed to bear no responsibility for financial risk 
management as they can collect all costs not met by government payments from patient 
payments, just as they did pre-2002.   
 
These arrangements appear to arise as a consequence of a lack of clarity in NHC (2000) about 
the difference between ‘population-based funding’ of risk managers and ‘capitation 
contracting’ (i.e. supply-side risk-sharing) with service providers.  Whereas the contracts may 
have similar structures, in that both may have a fixed and a variable remuneration component, 
the effects of the incentive strength in each case is crucially dependent upon the 
characteristics of the recipient and the desired objectives.  It is also crucially important to be 
aware of the locus of collection of costs not borne by the subsidiser.  If the subsidy is a risk 
management (i.e. insurance premium) subsidy paid in respect of all individuals ex ante, then 
presumably the unmet costs should be paid by all beneficiaries of the subsidy (i.e. all 
individuals ex ante, in the form of an insurance premium top-up, as occurs when all 
employees top up the premiums paid by employers in United States subsidised insurance 
schemes or New Zealand’s Accident Compensation (ACC) scheme).  However, if the subsidy 
is a treatment subsidy in order to assist an individual to pay a service provider’s fee, and the 
subsidy does not meet the full cost of that fee, then it is appropriate for the beneficiary (in this 
case, the ill patient) to meet the difference.   
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To subsidise on the first assumption but to charge on the second raises the question about who 
will pay the costs of any difference between anticipated and actual demand (i.e. the costs of 
risk management).  Treating a premium subsidy and a ‘notional averaged treatment subsidy’ 
interchangeably, even though at the average expectations, they can be mathematically 
equated, fails to address the fact that a variation between the anticipated ‘average’ demand for 
which the risk manager is remunerated ex ante and the actual demand for which financial 
responsibility is incurred ex post is inevitable.  The costs of variation must be met by 
someone.  In the NZPHCS, on the one hand, PHOs and service providers are paid via 
capitation contracts that require them to bear financial risk, but on the other hand, the ability 
for service providers to charge patient fees is governed by the expectations prevailing pre-
2002, meaning only patients falling ill and consuming services pay the costs not met by 
government.  Under the New Zealand arrangements, any costs of variation between the 
anticipated demand for which PHOs and service providers are funded and actual demand is 
paid only by that subset of patients falling ill and consuming primary health care services.  
However, the risk management cost is not paid equally by equally ill individuals.  Patient 
payments are required to vary according to the patient’s capitation subsidy class, as if the 
government payment is a ‘notional averaged treatment subsidy’.   
 
The consequence is a set of payment arrangements unique amongst healthcare systems.  On 
the one hand, the arrangements result in sharply increasing service provider capitation 
incentives over time.  Increased government payments result in a greater share of the 
provider’s income becoming fixed as the patient payments must decrease at each stage. On 
the other hand, as service providers rather than the government set the variable payments and 
they are paid by patients rather than the government.  The government bears no responsibility 
for financial risk management at all, despite being the third party purchaser aggregating risk 
management for individuals in the first place.  Risk management and ‘practitioner fee top-
ups’ become bundled into a single payment, paid by the patient.  The government is not 
actually setting a capitation incentive for providers at all under this system.  Instead, it relies 
upon price monitoring and regulation by DHBs to ensure service providers to ‘pass through’ 
the capitation subsidies for all patients to ill patients as if they are ‘notional averaged 
treatment subsidies’.  This restricts the ability for providers to pass on the risk management 
costs to patients, but ultimately the costs must be recouped if providers are to remain 
financially viable.  Whilst ‘lucky’ practices can extract ‘windfall’ profits, ‘unlucky’ ones must 
either charge patients, reduce quality or go out of business.  The allocation of the risk 
management costs are hence unequal, as patient payments now depend upon the ‘luck’ (health 
state) of other patients at the same practice.   Moreover, under the NZPHCS, the risk 
management costs are paid only by those individuals unlucky enough to fall ill.  Well 
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individuals, who receive premium subsidies from government, but who do not consume any 
primary care services, pay none of these costs.   
 
Not surprisingly, the result is a substantially confused set of arrangements that is patently 
unable to deliver either increased equity or induce the desired behavioural changes.    Rather, 
as is shown in the first two parts of this subsection, the unique New Zealand arrangements 
will simply result in a very costly, inequitable system as predicted from Howell (2007).  
Evidence is already emerging of the consequences of over-strong incentives crowding out 
other benefits, and the peculiar arrangements actually invalidate the use of financial 
incentives to induce any behavioural change by service providers.  Moreover, even if the a 
standard set of managed care arrangements was applied, the equity and provider behaviour 
outcomes desired by the NZPHCS are quite unlikely to be achieved in a capitated system, as 
such systems are inequitable by nature and the ability of primary care providers to manage 
patient demand by the use of preventative tools is likely to be small.  Rather, such objectives 
are more likely to be achieved using non-price instruments.  
 
3.1 Very Strong Incentives Increasing Over Time 
Under the NZPHCS institutional design, the PHOs, who are best placed to undertake risk 
management and to design balanced contracts to remunerate providers, based upon the actual 
demand each provider faces and the extent to which behavioural changes by providers can be 
realistically incentivised using financial risk-sharing, simply pass the financial risk on to 
service providers via the ‘back-to-back’ contracts.  The government’s funding schedule 
whereby it ramps up the share of the sector expenses it anticipates meeting as budgets permit 
thus sets the strength of the financial incentive contract faced by service providers, and at 
each stage the government increases its share of funding, the incentive becomes sharper.  
Political priorities, not information about practitioner demand management abilities, now set 
the contract incentive strength.    
 
The initial incentive strength faced by providers at the beginning of the NZPHCS was 
moderate.  However, the incentive strength - and the share of both random and predictable 
risk shared with the practitioner - increases over time with each successive rollout to a new 
population group, as the corresponding patient charge must reduce.   That is, each time a new 
capitation class becomes eligible for higher government funding, the share of a practitioner’s 
income that is fixed – i.e. f - increases, and average v charged to patients decreases.   
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3.1.1 Likely Consequences 
If, as it is expected, government contributions are ultimately 80% of sector spending, then 
ultimately 80% of practitioner income will become invariant to effort.  NHC (2000) does not 
suggest that the NZPHCS should eliminate the focus on the consultation as the primary 
output.  Rather, it contends that the consultation remains the main means of primary care 
delivery even in a population-based care system.  Yet, under the NZPHCS, the marginal 
return ultimately received by a practitioner for the effort of delivering an additional 
consultation will be on average only 20% of the cost of delivering it.  This is an extremely 
strong incentive that appears quite out of proportion to the ability of practitioners to manage 
via clinical processes alone.   There will likely be substantial distortions in the market as the 
effects of over-much random risk shared with practitioners rapidly crowd out any benefits 
from alteration in practitioner behaviour.  Not only does the capitation strength increase with 
each rollout, but the pools within which the risks are shared extremely small, geographically 
focused practices generally with only 1200-2000 individuals.  Demand risk is highly 
correlated amongst small pools.  Variations between extreme profitability and financial 
failure from luck will be considerable. The likely consequences of predictions 1 to 7 will 
emerge rapidly, and they will be extreme. Moreover, the extent of the inequities generated, 
both financially and in service quality received, will likely be very large. 
 
Indeed, it is extremely puzzling that a tool whose primary direct consequence is a restriction 
in the supply of consultations would be adopted at all in a market where there were already 
significant concerns about the ability to supply anticipated demand, let alone a capitation 
contract with such intense incentive strength.  There is negligible evidence of pre-existing 
over-consumption arising from extensive subsidies in the New Zealand market (indeed, over 
half the population has historically paid the full cost of primary health care) – rather the 
predominant effect observed in NHC (2000) and which capitation has been introduced 
purportedly to address (NHC, 2000) is under-consumption, specifically by those previously 
eligible for subsidies on the basis of income, age and health need.   By Howell’s predictions 2 
and 7, and Robinson (2001) it would seem that given the specific circumstances of the New 
Zealand market, a remuneration instrument favouring increased output by hard-working 
practitioners – i.e. fee-for-service or one with very low incentive strength - would be 
preferable.  Instead, by prediction 2, the NZPHCS risks invoking a very substantial decrease 
in the number of consultations provided compared to the pre-2002 counterfactual.  Whilst it is 
possible that a restriction in supply may be deemed necessary to curb anticipated excessive 
over-consumption by the 53% of newly-subsidised individuals (Shen and McFeeters, 2005), 
this is not articulated as a capitation objective.  
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Under the NZPHCS, ‘unlucky’ practices, with their restricted ability to bear the very large 
costs of random demand variation, would be expected to rapidly move to stop their losses by 
restricting consultation quantities whilst ‘lucky’ practices will do so to cement in their 
‘windfall’ profits.  Both practice types will likely ‘close the books’ (predictions 2 and 3), 
reducing the supply of consultations.  However, this will not be enough for severely unlucky 
practices who still receive more demand than they can afford to service.  They must respond 
by reducing average costs per consultation by restricting quality (e.g. shorter consultations, 
longer waiting lists for appointments – prediction 1).  This will lead to uneven distribution of 
care quality across the wider population, with the lowest quality care5 being systematically 
provided by practices where health state is lower than average (prediction 1 – this is the 
characteristic that leads to higher-than-average demand in the first place).   
 
Meanwhile, the financial consequences of the distribution of patients will lead to higher 
valuations for ‘lucky’ practices making habitual profits, higher overall prices for all patients 
(prediction 4) and a missing market for ownership of habitually loss-making practices as 
practitioner-owners walk away and nonprofit and charity owners move in to take them over.  
The consequence is an ownership and quality bifurcation (predictions 5 and 6), with large, 
nonprofit and charity providers serving sicker-than-average populations with lower-quality 
consultations, whilst healthier-than-average populations receiving higher-quality care from 
smaller, private practitioner-owned practices.  Ultimately, this will reflect in practitioner 
selection, both within the capitated system and out of it, as hard-working practitioner-owners 
look for better returns than the effective 80% tax on their efforts and investments in human 
capital that NZPHCS extracts. 
 
3.1.2 Evidence 
Whilst it is difficult within a ‘live experiment’ in uncontrolled conditions to attribute a cause 
to specific observations, it is possible to match patterns in the observations to a theory that 
provides a possible explanation.  The greater the number of individual observations that are 
consistent with the theory, the more likely it is that the theory offers a credible explanation for 
observed outcomes.  There are many observations already that suggest the above predictions 
are coming to pass. 
 
                                                     
5 This is not to suggest that the care quality consciously provided by any individual practitioner is different – it simply reflects the 
reality of more consultations having to be provided for a given level of resourcing – e.g. patients wait longer (endure the 
symptoms of illness longer) for an appointment.  The alternative is for the practitioner to accept a lower return for each 
consultation (i.e. same remuneration, more appointments).  However, this eventually reflects in practitioner choices (e.g. salaried 
employment limiting time worked at a fixed remuneration per hour).  
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The staged way in which the capitation payments were rolled out means that those practices 
with higher proportions of higher-capitated patients initially would face stronger incentives in 
the early stages than practices with lower proportions.  Thus they would be more likely to 
exhibit behaviour consistent with over-much financial risk-bearing earlier than their 
counterparts facing less strong incentives.  The first evidence of strategic ‘closing the books’ 
directly associated with the NZPHCS emerges in early 2005, in two areas where initially 
higher-capitated populations are disproportionately represented in the population mix – one 
with one of the highest proportions of elderly people in the country and one with a very high 
proportion of low income Maori and Polynesian individuals (Stevenson, 2005).  PHOs were 
established in these areas in 2004 and 2003 respectively.  Subsequently, as the higher 
capitation payments have been rolled out, anecdotal evidence has emerged that ‘closing the 
books’ has become a far more widespread practice.   
 
Whether ‘closing the books’ is due to cementing in profits, minimising losses, or as has been 
claimed, a practitioner shortage, the effect is the same – it limits the number of consultations 
provided by the practitioners at substantially less than cost.   As an example, a practitioner 
employed at a nonprofit Iwi provider was requested in early 2006 to reduce the number of 
consultations delivered in order to reduce costs (personal communication). It is a moot point 
whether a co-incidental practitioner shortage in initially highly-capitated areas is an 
underlying environmental factor or a consequence of the capitation policy.  Higher levels of 
financial risk indicated by the area demographics would render such areas as less desirable 
places in which to establish a new practice under capitation in the first place.  That existing 
practitioners have likely already distorted patient supply by ‘closing the books’ simply 
decreases the appeal of such areas even further for new practitioners, exacerbating the effect 
of a practitioner supply shortage of any origin.  Thus, even if there was not a practitioner 
shortage in such an area initially, capitation funding would be consistent with creation of such 
shortages where there are concentrations of higher-capitated populations.  Thus, contrary to 
NHC (2000), capitation is highly unlikely to be associated with a more equitable allocation of 
practitioners (including in historically under-served areas).  If a more equitable allocation 
does arise, it will most likely be as a consequence of salaried providers being directed to 
supply services there by the (largely) nonprofit and charity providers who, by Howell’s 
predictions, will be left filling the ‘missing market’ for practitioners that capitation 
precipitates in areas of high demand and therefore high financial risk.  
 
The effects on the practitioner workforce already being observed are consistent with the 
predictions. The Royal New Zealand College of General Practitioners reports that between its 
2003 and 2005 surveys, the number of member-practitioners owning their own practices has 
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fallen to slightly over one half.  This is a marked decrease.  Moreover the number employed 
as salaried employees has doubled (RNZCGP, 2005)6. Furthermore, approximately 30% of its 
membership intends to change their work arrangements in the next five years, and 47% of 
those intending to change their arrangements are currently self-employed.  Only 4% (i.e. 1.2% 
of membership) intends to move into full time, self-employed general practice compared to 
27.2% of respondents in 2003.  This will have a significant effect on the number of 
consultations offered, given that full-time practice-owning practitioners work on average 20% 
more hours than full-time salaried practitioners (RNZGCP, 2005).  This suggests a substantial 
decrease in the willingness of practitioners to exert effort, commensurate with their 
anticipation of the effect on their incomes as capitation incentives become sharper, as 
predicted.   
 
3.1.3 Practitioner Work Habits 
The surveys also reveal a substantial increase in the number of members indicating an 
intention to move into salaried or locum work (23.2% in 2005, 16.8% in 2003).  A further 
10.7% (up from 1.5% in 2003) indicate an intention to move into non-GP medical work, 
taking up the opportunity to move into salaried positions within PHOs and DHBs.  These 
individuals cite both income security and higher levels of remuneration as principal reasons 
underpinning this decision.  That such a high percentage of practitioners far from retirement 
age is planning such moves suggests that either in anticipation or actuality, altered financial 
risk-bearing associated with the NZPHCS is changing the nature of the profession.   The 
altered risk management arrangements may also be a factor in the rise in the number planning 
to retire from 7.5% in 2003 to 17.9% in 2005.  Notably, declining income in general practice 
was cited as the third most important primary reason (10% of respondents) for changing work 
practices, after retirement (19.2%) and family (15%), with a 7% citing increasing regulation 
of general practice as a factor.   
 
Whilst there are still many practitioners happy to remain in self-employment under capitation, 
Howell’s predictions 1 and 7 would suggest that these are likely the owners of the ‘lucky’ 
practices.  McAvoy and Coster’s (2005:11) survey reveals that “many GPs have already 
benefited, reporting improved incomes and financial benefits from joining the PHOs”.  This is 
quite consistent with the accrual of windfall profits available to the 50% of practices 
delivering fewer than the average number of consultations. 
 
                                                     
6 It is noted that these figures are not directly comparable to the ones of Crampton, Davis and Lay-Yee (2005) cited above, as 
they come from surveys with different bases – Crampton, Davis and Lay-Yee’s figures measure practitioners working at a given 
time, whilst RNZCGP polled its members holding a current practising certificate, even if they were not currently working at the 
time of the survey.  Nonetheless, the trends noted are significant.  
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Evidence of a ‘missing market’ for practice ownership is also emerging.  In 2003 the number 
of practitioners intending to move into self-employment exceeded the number planning to 
retire by some 35%, suggesting a viable market for practice ownership as established 
practitioners retiring sold practices to new owners.  In 2005 the retiring percent exceeded the 
practice-seekers by over 2%, without even considering the additional 10.7% of practitioners 
intending to seek employment outside of the profession.  If there are no potential buyers for 
some of these practices, then who will assume responsibility for the patients?  There seems to 
be no other option but for nonprofit and charity providers to step in and fill the void.   
 
3.2 The Practitioner Sets, and the Patient Pays, v 
The second defining feature of the NZPHCS is that, whilst the government sets f, the 
practitioner sets v in order to recover costs.  This has some particularly perverse effects in 
regard to inequitable allocation of the financial burden of the system based upon health need, 
as ill individuals pay a premium covering risk management costs associated with the 
allocation of individuals to patient pools, but well individuals in the same pool do not.  
Furthermore, the more times an individual consumes care, the more times a contribution 
towards the risk management costs is made.  In effect, the risk management payment becomes 
a ‘tax’ on falling ill.   Sicker individuals of sicker-than-average practices are taxed more than 
either their sicker-than-average counterparts at healthier-than-average practices (via higher 
fees or lower service quality) or their well counterparts at the same practice.    This is far from 
the desire to share costs more equitably.   
 
The NZPHCS is thus neither equitable in resource allocation nor capable of altering provider 
behaviour in the manner anticipated by NHC (2000).  The most tangible result of the 
NZPHCS capitation arrangements is rather to increase the costs of delivering care inequitably, 
relative to the pre-2002 counterfactual.   
 
3.2.1 An Impotent Incentive Contract  
The NZPHCS payment arrangements are extraordinary in any capitation contract, as typically 
the objective of such a contract is for the purchaser to alter practitioner behaviour by 
controlling practitioner income.  The purchaser sets and pays both f and v in order to ensure 
that the financial incentive will bight.  If the practitioner can set v, and the patient, not the 
purchasing entity, makes the payment, then the purchaser cannot control practitioner income.  
The NZPHCS renders the Government, DHBs and PHOs all impotent in altering practitioner 
behaviour using financial incentives.  The practitioner can simply pass on the costs of 
undesirable behaviour, in addition to the costs of ‘luck’ – good or bad - to the patients.  The 
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NZPHCS rationale of capitation as a tool to alter practitioner behaviour is therefore woefully 
misguided given these payment arrangements.  
 
Whilst the purchaser can endeavour to use price monitoring and regulation to try and prevent 
practitioner price pass-throughs occurring as a means of attempting to reinstate the financial 
incentive, this is extremely difficult and costly to implement and enforce.  Moreover, it 
substantially defeats the purpose of using financial incentives in the first place. The very 
reason for using incentives is that they are cost-effective ways of achieving the desired 
behavioural changes without having to incur costly monitoring, especially in cases, such as 
third party purchase, where the purchasing party cannot observe the actual behaviour that it 
wishes to change or incentivise (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).   If monitoring must be 
employed in order to overcome the design deficits of the imperfect incentive contract, it might 
be more cost-effective to use the additional resources that will inevitably be spent under the 
NZPHCS arrangements (albeit by patients) to encourage desired behaviour using non-
financial instruments (e.g. targeted practitioner education).   
 
3.2.2 With Higher Total Costs 
Nonetheless, separate setting of the fixed and variable payments without any overt price 
controls will likely slow down the rate at which the bifurcation on quality and practice 
ownership will emerge relative to the counterfactual of an effective purchaser-controlled 
capitation contract.  This occurs because the costs of loss-making ‘unlucky’ practices can be 
converted from patient costs in the form of lower service quality to financial costs.  This 
results in the rate at which consultation numbers are restricted being retarded and quality 
differences may not be so great.  However, the total financial costs expended will be higher, 
for the patients of both ‘unlucky’ and ‘lucky’ practices.   Figure 1 illustrates.  
 
Assume that the government sets the fixed capitation payment assuming Q consultations will 
be provided at an average cost c by a practitioner at an anticipated patient co-payment v, but 
that an ‘unlucky’ provider is required to provide Q1 consultations when charging v.  The 
practitioner makes losses at this price, so increases the patient charge per consultation to v+y,  
in which case he breaks even delivering Q1 consultations (in effect, he shifts his average 
revenue curve to the right by raising the patient payment).  However, a ‘lucky’ practitioner 
who delivered only Q2 consultations at f and v can now raise his price to v+y as well (i.e. shift 
his average revenue curve to the right as per the ‘unlucky’ provider).  The ‘lucky’ practitioner 
is now even more profitable than before.   
7/26/2007 -26- 26
  
Figure 1. Average Revenue Per Consultation 
 
 
Average Revenue 
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$ 
Average Revenue  
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Moreover, ‘unlucky’ practitioners delivering between Q and Q1 consultations now move 
from making losses to making profits.  Lucky’ practitioners are therefore likely to be quite 
supportive of the ability for their ‘unlucky’ colleagues to raise prices in this manner (e.g. by 
suggesting that all practices are facing financial pressure at the current anticipated rates of f 
and v).  If the price regulators allow the most ‘unlucky’ provider to set his prices in order to 
remain financially viable, and then use this amount as a benchmark for the price increases 
allowed by all other providers, then all but the ‘unluckiest’ provider makes profits in excess 
of costs.  However, it is the patients, rather than the Government, who will bear the additional 
costs, as it is the patient charge, v, that is raised.  
 
3.2.3 The Evidence 
The monopolistically competitive nature of the sector suggests that many New Zealand 
practices would be able to raise prices to some extent in this manner without losing patients.  
That all practitioners are now made aware of their colleagues’ price increases via PHO 
membership increases the ability for ‘lucky’ practices to respond strategically (and costlessly) 
to price-raising actions by their ‘unlucky’ counterparts (previously they would have had to 
expend effort to discover their colleagues’ prices).  In a fee survey undertaken very shortly 
after the implementation of the NZPHCS, CBG (2004:7) reports that even low-capitated 
‘Interim’ practices were charging patients higher fees than their uncapitated non-PHO 
counterparts for population groups for whom no government capitation subsidies were paid.  
This suggests that the higher costs of financial risk-bearing under the NZPHCS were already 
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noticeable in cost pass-throughs to patients even in the early days of the strategy, when 
capitation incentives were weak and the extent of losses comparatively small.  Such pass-
throughs are now likely to be much larger in size, but much harder to detect, as most patients 
are now PHO members and few practices aside from after-hours services exist specifically to 
serve non-PHO patients, meaning that it is very difficult to find a comparison ‘consultation 
price’ against which to benchmark the costs of  risk-bearing via pass-throughs.    
 
As noted in section 2, New Zealand practitioners have been able to raise prices by nearly 
twice the rate of inflation during the time of the NZPHCS, whilst capitation incentives were 
still relatively weak.  The Minister has also observed that the Government’s share of sector 
expenditure has not increased as fast as had been anticipated for the amount of additional 
funding provided.  Both of these observations would be consistent with widespread price rises 
to cover both losses from bad luck and opportunistic increases by practice owners.  Indeed, an 
absence of widespread evidence of practice financial failure, combined with McAvoy and 
Coster’s (2005) observation that many practitioners are enjoying improved financial 
circumstances under the NZPHCS, suggests that to date, prices have been allowed to increase 
so that very few practices are facing severe financial stress.  If this is the case, then more than 
the average number of practices must be making ‘windfall’ profits substantially in excess of 
costs.  The attempts by the MoH to impose price controls in conjunction with the rollout of 
increased capitation funding in 2006 and subsequently more rigorous price monitoring by 
DHBs appears to confirm that the regulators wish to constrain the widespread passing-
through of additional costs.  Such action would be unnecessary if such behaviour was not 
occurring.  
 
That there has already been significant alteration in practice ownership behaviour and 
expression of future intentions to leave the sector are not inconsistent with the observed 
ability of many practitioners to make profits in the short run via the widespread ability to raise 
prices.  Firstly, not all practitioners will have the ability to raise prices, meaning there will 
already be some localised evidence of financial stress governing practitioner decisions.  
Secondly, ‘closing the books’ locking in existing profits now, and making decisions to leave 
the profession in the near future (‘exiting while still ‘ahead’ or leaving for greener pastures 
when the going gets tougher) are both consistent with practitioners factoring the likely effects 
of future higher-strength capitation contracts and more rigorous future scrutiny on prices into 
their personal decision-making.  Indeed, the best time for lucky practitioners to exit would be 
after the final round of capitation increases occurs, as at that point, both the additional 
practice profits from luck plus the higher practice ‘goodwill’ bounty can be realised by the 
current owner.   
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So far, there has also been limited evidence of a bifurcation in the sector based upon 
ownership and quality.   If few practices are facing financial stress as they have been able to 
raise prices, then this does not invalidate the predictions.  However, the total cost and average 
cost of delivering the larger-than-anticipated number of consultations provided will be 
considerably higher than anticipated when the ‘capitated average’ was set.  The only issue is 
whether the even higher average prices are being paid by patients in cash or in forfeited 
quality (e.g. the Iwi provider cited above, where quantity was restricted and waiting lists 
instituted).  More rigorous price monitoring by DHBs suggests that cost pass-throughs via 
price increases may in future be more limited, with the consequent increase in pace towards a 
bifurcated system based upon ownership and quality, as in predictions 1 to 5, rather than 
patient willingness and/or ability to pay.  However, the distributional effects remain 
unchanged.  As per prediction 1, the effects are more marked for patients of ‘unlucky’ 
providers.   
 
3.2.4 Implications for Industry Structure 
Combining the evidence to date of changes in anticipated practitioner behaviours with the 
evidence of likely increased price monitoring suggests that the pressure on loss-making 
practice owners will start becoming more acute.  Howell (2007) predicts the growth of 
nonprofit and charity provision in loss-making practices.  This begs the question of who the 
nonprofit and charity providers taking over practice ownership under the NZPHCS might be. 
 
It is noted that PHOs were constructed under the NZPHCS as ‘nonprofit community-
governed’ organisations in the form strongly favoured in NHC (2000) as providers of primary 
care.  To date, they are co-ordinating care provision, but in most instances are not providing 
care directly to patients. It is unclear if they will have any contractual liability for the 
provision of care to the patients of practitioners who walk away. Nonetheless, there may be 
some moral or political obligation for PHOs to assume responsibility (e.g. by hiring salaried 
providers to staff some practices – it is noted that many PHOs already operate locum 
schemes, so potentially have processes in place to manage the supply of salaried practitioners 
to ‘unowned’ practices).  
 
However, if PHOs do come to dominate care delivery by assuming responsibility for failed 
practices, ironically the NHC (2000) objective of community-provided care may be achieved, 
but not as a consequence of the firms’ superior ability to deliver care to marginalised 
populations, as suggested by Crampton and Starfield (2004) and Crampton, Davis and Lay-
Yee (2005).  Rather, it will be as a consequence of one the most cogent economic reasons for 
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nonprofit presence in any sector – to address a market failure (James and Rose-Ackerman, 
1986).  Notably, many of the pre-2002 nonprofit organisations providing the model for the 
preferred care delivery form also emerged as a consequence of market failures – the failure of 
practitioner-owners to provide care delivery of a designated type for a specific population.   
 
That new care provider forms were able to emerge in the 1990s was a consequence of a 
plurality of funding forms.  Returning to a single funding form will likely contribute to an 
increased probability of localised market failures again occurring, and a diminution of 
incentives for privately-owned practitioners to fill the gaps.  However, if nonprofit PHOs 
move to ‘fill the missing market’, they will do so from a very different institutional basis than 
that of the organisations championed by the NHC.  The ‘community governance’ of the NHC-
preferred pre-2002 nonprofit providers has emerged principally from their origins as 
consumer-owned and governed co-operatives.  As the majority of PHOs have emerged from 
provider-owned co-operatives, even though they have consumer representation, in practice, 
their decision-making and control lies predominantly with practitioners, often via the IPA-
origin management companies (Howell, 2006a).  It is debatable whether these ‘community-
governed nonprofit’ organisations, many formed largely out of pragmatism in order to ensure 
privately-owned general practices remained financially viable given the distortions in 
government subsidies that so strongly favoured patients served by PHO-aligned practitioners 
under the NZPHCS (Howell, 2006a), will have the same focus on alternative delivery 
methods and sensitivity to individual consumer needs as the ones formed by consumers in the 
interests of consumers (i.e. community-owned co-operatives versus supplier-owned co-
operatives - Hansmann, 1996).   
 
3.3 Alignment of Motivations and Capitation in the NZPHCS 
The specific characteristics of the New Zealand policy analysed so far are sufficient to 
suggest that the NZPHCS capitation instrument as implemented is costly, flawed and unable 
to deliver the articulated equity and practitioner behaviour objectives.  If the desired changes 
do occur, it will be as a consequence of the non-financial instruments of the strategy.  It is 
apposite at this point to consider whether it is the specific idiosyncrasies of the New Zealand 
system – the strong incentives and the ability for practitioners to set charges – that lead to this 
outcome, or whether capitation per se results in contrary outcomes to the policy’s objectives.   
 
Taking in turn each of increased equity and the targeting of high health need, encouraging a 
team approach to primary health care, and a change in emphasis towards a prevention-focused 
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care management model as opposed to a model of episodic intervention based on illness, this 
subsection finds that few of the NZPHCS objectives could have been achieved using a single 
capitation contract.  Rather, the discussion suggests that the confusion about what the 
capitation contract is intended to achieve, and is capable of achieving, results in a single 
instrument endeavouring to achieve multiple conflicting tasks with the consequent creation of 
contradictory equity and targeting signals. Moreover, the nexus between capitation and 
increased teamwork and preventative care is also quite weak, with any positive effects likely 
to take a long time to occur, if they can occur at all.  Once again, the non-price elements of 
the strategy are more likely to achieve the desired outcomes, with fewer distortions in 
resource allocation and sector investment.  
 
3.3.1. Capitation, Equity and Targeting of High Health Need 
Whilst the NZPHCS is equitable in its allocation of capitation subsidies based on ex ante 
assessments of registered individuals’ likely demands for care, all capitated systems are 
inherently inequitable in their allocation of resources (i.e. consultations, practitioner time) 
based upon ex post realised demand, due to the random effects of patient allocation to 
practices, combined with serial correlation of patient demands across time.  If the capitation 
incentive is weak, and the patient pools are very large, then the effects of the inequities may 
be small enough that the benefits from reduced ‘predictable risk’ are not crowded out.  But if 
the pools are small and the incentives strong, then the inequities will be large, and strongly 
biased against the interests of those with the greatest health needs.   
 
Furthermore, the strategic behaviours of providers in capitated systems to manage their 
exposure to financial risks (prediction 3) leads to additional inequities associated with the 
introduction of capitation in environments (such as New Zealand’s) where some patients have 
established relationships with providers and others do not.  By prediction 2, capitated systems 
limit consultations.   This favours those already ‘on a provider’s books’ when capitation is 
implemented and providers strategically ‘close the books’.  If the unregistered population is 
presumed to be of ‘average’ health state, then unregistered individuals will have difficulty 
gaining registration at ‘lucky’ providers.  They may, however, be able to enrol at an ‘unlucky’ 
provider as an ‘average’ unregistered health state individual will, on average, raise the 
average health state of an ‘unhealthier than average’ patient pool.  However, if there is a 
widespread expectation that unregistered individuals have on average higher health needs 
than registered individuals (as occurs on the NZPHCS), then registering a previously-
unregistered individual becomes undesirable even for ‘unlucky’ practices.  If an individual 
with ‘lower-than-average’ health state is registered at an ‘unlucky’ practice, then the 
additional demand that the individual brings will increase the extent of the practice loss, 
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increasing practice financial pressure.  Registering such individuals results in even further 
cuts in care quality (e.g. shorter consultation, waiting lists for appointments) supplied to the 
‘unlucky’ individuals at the practice, who are most in need of care.  The net effect is an 
acceleration of the changes in practice ownership and the emergence of a two-tier system 
based on quality, as in predictions 4 to 7.     
 
Furthermore, paying higher capitation fees for those perceived to have higher need does not 
address the increases in random risk arising from variations between predicted and actual 
costs and their allocation across practices, as the higher capitation rates actually increase the 
capitation incentive strength and thus the amount of random risk borne by the providers 
receiving them.   The effect is instead to accelerate the accrual of perverse consequences of 
over-high risk-sharing.  The ‘lucky’ practices simply become more profitable, and the ‘loss-
making ones have to reduce quality even more, and bifurcation happens faster.  It is noted that 
in typical managed care systems, higher payments for individuals of higher need are in fact 
‘risk-rated insurance premiums’ paid to risk managers, reflecting higher demand expectation 
for that individual.  Such systems generally do not discriminate between the premium paid to 
a care provider for the individual and the variable price paid for each consultation delivered, 
irrespective of the identity of the individual receiving the care.  That is, f is determined by the 
individual characteristics of all individuals for whom the manager is responsible, but v is 
identical for all consultations provided.   
 
Whilst ‘unlucky’ practitioners may endeavour to account for lower care quality by allocating 
their time disproportionately to the sickest of their ‘sicker-than-average’ patients, this simply 
lowers the care quality even more for their ‘less frequently ill’  patients, relative to that 
received by the patients of identical health need at ‘lucky’ practices. Patient practice selection 
based upon care quality (easily observable via shorter waiting times, longer consultations etc.) 
now becomes an issue further exacerbating the bifurcation.  Healthier patients able to verify 
their lower care demands (e.g. via patient records), will be highly desirable at other, more 
lucky practices, and may move to receive higher quality care7, taking their capitation 
payments with them.   This exposes the ‘unlucky’ practices to further financial pressure as 
they now become even more concentrated upon the delivery of care to the sickest members of 
the population, who demand more consultations, but bring only a very small fraction of their 
additional costs into the practice by way of variable payments.   
 
                                                     
7 If the care quality differential is sufficiently large and easily discernable (e.g. being able to guarantee getting an appointment at 
a given time), the uncertainty cost of switching practitioners may be outweighed, thereby overcoming some of the problems 
normally associated with an information asymmetry about practitioner quality that characterises practitioner market power in 
monopolistically competitive markets.   
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Capitation systems are thus inherently antithetic to equitable allocation of care based upon 
health need.  Contrary to the claims made by NHC (2000), fee-for-service payment systems 
are the most equitable (least distorting) form of remuneration in this dimension, as they 
reward practitioners fairly for the costs of treating all sick individuals.  There are no financial 
risks for practitioners of registering sicker-than-average patients ‘on the books’, or in 
providing more treatments to such individuals (Robinson, 2001).    
 
3.3.2 Variable Capitation Payments and Equity 
NHC (2000) appears to make no distinction between two different tasks for a primary health 
care system in New Zealand – identifying and registering at-risk populations not already 
receiving care, and the allocation of available resources amongst identified individuals.  
Consequently, the paper appears to treat ‘access’ (registration) and ‘usage’ (consultations) 
interchangeably, when in fact they are distinct tasks.  A single contract bundling the two tasks 
together and remunerating both with the same incentive will achieve neither perfectly.   
However, the one that receives greatest attention is the one that has the greatest effect on the 
individual’s returns from the contract (i.e. the one that leads to higher profits/smaller losses) 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).  It is now crucial to know whether the primary purpose of 
strong capitation incentives in the New Zealand policy is primarily to reward practitioners 
who identify and sign up at-risk individuals (a ‘bounty’) or primarily a financial risk-sharing 
agreement whereby the provider becomes the individual’s insurer in order to allocate 
available care amongst registered individuals.    
 
The content of NHC (2000) appears to suggest that under-registration is the principal reason 
for under-usage in New Zealand. However, in the NZPHCS design, it is service providers 
who are charged with both identifying and registering individuals, and delivering services to 
them.  The single capitation payment by which they are rewarded must induce them to 
undertake both of these activities.  On the one hand, capitation payments with strong 
incentives for the delivery of care lead to higher costs from the risks of arising from the likely 
higher effort these previously unregistered high-risk individuals will incur.  Providers are thus 
averse to exerting effort in identifying and signing on such individuals as they bring too much 
financial risk.  On the other hand, a strong financial incentive rewarding the registration of at 
risk individuals, independent of the financial risk of meeting these individuals’ higher 
demands would have the effect of inducing providers to expend effort identifying and signing 
up at-risk individuals.  
 
The optimal capitation strength will vary for these two tasks, depending upon a number of 
characteristics.  They are also diametrically opposed in the direction of capitation strength.  
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For example, if the service provider is small, with limited ability to bear financial risk, and 
risk-management is the primary objective, then a weak capitation incentive is desirable, no 
matter how important it may be to sign up unregistered individuals with high health needs, as 
a strong incentive with limited recourse to cost recovery for the additional costs such 
individuals engender will simply encourage providers to become more active cream-
skimmers in order to avoid financial risk.  However, if the same practitioner is rewarded 
separately, with one contract for sign-up having a strong ‘bounty’ incentive, and a second 
contract for service provision with a weak capitation incentive,  the financial consequences of 
unexpected demand increases from higher-need individuals are minimal, and the provider 
may be prepared to more actively engage in the exertion of effort to identify and register at 
risk individuals.   
 
The desire for single remuneration agreement for providers in the NZPHCS appears to have 
resulted in a contract structure highly unlikely to address the registration inequity, as it fails to 
recognise the differences between registration rewards and financial risk management costs 
under population-based funding.  This appears to have been exacerbated by the widespread 
creation of PHOs as extensions of existing providers as a consequence of legacy relationships, 
rather than PHOs being established first as risk-bearing entities and then contracting with 
service providers for a defined PHO (as opposed to practitioner) patient base.  The PHO 
formation process has bundled insurance and care delivery so that the apparently most 
important objective to promote access to care for at-risk individuals (registration) is being 
crowded out by the perverse effects of random risk-sharing with a high capitation incentive 
via care delivery contracts, because service providers are required to do both tasks.  
Separating the contracts and the remuneration streams between the two different entities 
would have allowed for contract-setting more sensitive to the size of each entity’s pools (i.e. 
large pool for a PHO, small pool for a service provider; strong incentives for the PHO, 
weaker ones for the service provider)8.   
 
3.3.3 Variable Patient Payments and Equity 
Clarity regarding the contractual objectives of PHOs and service providers would also have 
helped separate out a further objective of the NZPHCS that is bundled in with the single 
payment – socially-motivated wealth transfers.  In a capitated health care system, it should 
not matter what payment is made in respect of an individual ex ante to the risk manager in 
anticipation of likely demand when setting the variable remuneration.  All individuals who 
                                                     
8 It is noted that PHOs are paid a ‘Services to Increase Access’ fee.  However in practice, all individuals are registered at a 
serviced provider in the first instance, not the PHO.  The practitioner ‘owns’ the patient list and patient choices of practitioner 
determine the PHO, not the other way around.   
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have fallen equally ill are ex post equally unlucky and therefore should pay the same patient 
payments (or have the same variable payments made on their behalf) to the care provider.   
For example, under England’s NHS (v=0) or a standard indemnity insurance arrangement 
(e.g. New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Corporation) the ex ante premium subsidy paid 
does not alter the patient payment charged (e.g. a forester for whom a high ex ante employer 
premium is paid because of higher risk pays the same co-payment as a clerk, for whom a 
lower ex ante employer premium commensurate with lower risk is paid, when each is treated 
for the same type of injury).   
 
Under the NZPHCS, however, the consumer’s’ identity (more precisely, the size of the ex 
ante premium paid by government) determines v and it is paid by the patient.  For example, a 
practitioner is expected to receive less for a consultation delivered to an under-five year old 
relative to an older patient, not because the consultation takes less effort, but because the 
policy expectations prevent averaging the costs of care for all patients across all classes by 
charging a single rate.   The primary health care system is thus still required to carry out 
discriminatory wealth transfers between classes of individuals via differential payments based 
upon ex ante patient characteristics rather than ex post health states.  This effect occurs not 
just during the transition to the capitated system, but is expected to persist once all population 
groups are eligible for higher capitation subsidies, at least in respect of children under 5.   
 
It appears that such expectations are occurring as a result of the confusion about what the 
capitation payment is to achieve, and who is responsible for each activity.  Such treatment-
based payment differentials ‘hang over’ from the pre-2002 system where government 
payments were ‘treatment subsidy’ welfare benefits to defray the costs of care for eligible 
individuals, but in order to reduce transaction costs were paid to service providers rather than 
the ill individual.  They were not part of the treatment remuneration contract, which was 
between the patient and the provider.  Under capitation, however, the treatment remuneration 
contract is between the PHO and the provider, and should be independent of the identity of 
the individual receiving the care.  This enables the PHO to customise the treatment contract to 
alter provider behaviour, but without crowding out desirable behaviour with over-much 
financial risk responsibility.  The risk management contract is between the government and 
the PHO, and the identity of the individual receiving an insurance subsidy is material, as it 
determines the government’s share of the premium paid.  If there is a wealth transfer to occur, 
this is a matter between the government, the PHO and the individual, and should be resolved 
by a ‘top-up payment’ being made by the subsidised individual at the point of subsidy (e.g. 
the individual ex ante qualifies for a higher ex ante premium subsidy, so makes a lower ex 
ante premium top-up to the PHO, rather than only ill individuals paying top-ups ex post).    
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It is in this respect that the treatment of the government capitation payment under the 
NZPHCS as a ‘notional averaged treatment subsidy’ in setting patient payments is most 
anomalous.  Patient payments will be unequal simply because of the luck of patient allocation 
to practices, but with the less well subsidised patients paying more of the risk costs than the 
higher-subsidised, and with consultation consumers paying more than non-consumers, each in 
proportion to the number of consultations consumed.  In the ACC (New Zealand’s state-
owned compulsory accident insurance scheme) analogy, if the costs incurred by a provider to 
treat injured foresters exceed those anticipated by the contract, then the provider must bill 
injured clerks more to pay for the higher costs of injured foresters (a wealth transfer from 
clerks to foresters).  Moreover, the uninjured clerks pay none of the additional costs of the 
injured foresters, as they haven’t been injured yet (an implicit wealth transfer (via costs 
foregone) from all injured individuals to all uninjured individuals).   The wealth transfer is 
effected, but with only ill individuals paying the ‘tax’.  Once again, clarity from separation of 
the respective responsibilities would have avoided this additional inequity.   
 
3.3.4 Team-Based Approach 
Whilst capitation “offers the potential for stimulating attention to epidemiological patterns of 
illness and care, of being buttressed by clinical protocols defining which form of care is 
expected in which context, and of encouraging resource-conserving practice innovations” 
(Robinson, 2001), in essence the one-to-one nature of primary health care consultations does 
not predispose the sector towards teamwork in the sense of many individuals working 
together to deliver a single consultation (Newhouse, 1973).  Strong financial incentives may 
lead to new service delivery methods such as reducing costs by allocating some consultations 
to lower-cost nurses, but these outcomes are more consistent with increasing specialisation 
than increasing teamwork – e.g. nurses provide vaccinations, dressings, education etc., whilst 
general practitioners specialise in diagnoses and procedures that necessitate their different 
human capital.  Indeed, increasing specialisation may lead to increases in the cost of service 
delivery, as it adds a co-ordination overhead not present when one individual undertakes all 
activities. United States research into the effects of increased specialisation within primary 
practice suggests that the co-ordination costs are substantial and may affect practice profits 
and productivity negatively, despite benefits accruing from increased collegiality (Reinhardt, 
Pauly and Held, 1989; Dobson, Pinker and Van Horn, 2005).   
 
Rather, it is predominantly the activity of developing purchasing contracts to meet an 
individual’s overall health needs (case management) that enables the co-ordination of a team 
of different provider types to service an individual’s many primary health care needs over an 
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extended time period.  It is unclear how paying primary care providers by capitation will 
advance this objective, except where the service provider also holds the budget for the 
purchase of these additional services for registered individuals (e.g. as in the United Kingdom 
– Majeed and Malcolm, 1999).  In the New Zealand context, it is the PHOs that are contracted 
in the first instance to undertake this responsibility.  General practitioners are just one of the 
many services with which PHOs will enter into contracts.  Whilst it may be appropriate to 
remunerate PHOs via capitation to encourage co-ordination activity, there would appear to be 
few further benefits in rewarding general practices via this instrument solely for the purpose 
of co-ordination and teamwork.  
 
3.3.5 Promotion of Wellness Replacing Illness-based Intervention 
The most cogent reason for the New Zealand use of capitation appears to be the objective to 
change the sector culture to one based on the promotion of wellness.  Payment by fee-for-
service rewards consultations delivered.  In a traditional view, remunerating practitioners for 
a consultation prompted by a patient presenting with a symptom links service delivery with 
instances of illness, leading to the view that fee-for-service incentivises an intervention-based 
culture of care delivery.  As consultations are the primary care provider’s principal cost-
driver, capitation payments theoretically incentivise providers to invest more in preventative 
actions in order to reduce the number of consultations demanded by the registered population 
when income is decoupled from the primary cost-driver.   
 
However, delivery of preventative treatments is also achieved predominantly via 
consultations, and is not costless.  It takes time to analyse records, deliver education, measure 
blood pressure and test urine samples for glucose, vaccinate etc. as well as deal with the 
patient’s presenting symptoms.  If additional preventative care is to be delivered, in the initial 
stages at least, this workload is incurred in addition to the normal volume of episodic 
treatments demanded by patients.  There are some economies of scale available in dealing 
with the preventative issues at the same time as a patient presents with a need for an episodic 
intervention.  Indeed, the requirement for education may be motivated by the diagnosis made 
during intervention.  But unequivocally, the costs of a shift to a wellness-promoting model are 
initially higher than under the counterfactual.   
 
Yet capitation incentivises reduction of consultation numbers and costs.  The more rapidly a 
capitation incentive is applied and the sharper the incentive strength is, the more likely the 
response of a practitioner will be to skimp on or even ignore prevention, unless it is 
remunerated under a separate contract.  As many preventative activities are standardised, 
easily monitored, and easily counted, transaction cost economics (as per Williamson, 1986) 
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suggests that they lend themselves well to fee-for-service remuneration.  Thus, many 
preventative treatments (e.g. vaccinations, asthma education and well child health checks) are 
not covered under the standard New Zealand primary care capitation contract, but are 
remunerated under separate fee-for-service or price-and-volume contracts.  Often, the same 
practices have multiple contracts for all of these services.  It is thus unclear what additional 
prevention activities it is anticipated the capitation contract will incentivise.   
 
Moreover, the benefits of additional preventative activities may take many years to accrue 
and are hard to quantify.  Whilst for specific interventions (e.g. influenza vaccinations) the 
payback is potentially large and immediate, for others, the payback may be small in total and 
take a long time to accrue. The practitioner investing the preventative effort will not 
necessarily be the one reaping the financial returns, as both patients and practitioners move 
between practices.  It is also very hard to target preventative care effectively (e.g. a lot of 
general education may be dispensed to many people, but only a few are actually go on to 
develop a condition) and preventative efforts such as education have substantial economies of 
scale that render individual practitioners with small patient bases at a disadvantage in 
delivering a service that is more cost-effectively delivered using population-based campaigns 
based around other delivery mechanisms (e.g. television, magazines).   At the very least, 
higher initial costs and long time delays in accruing the benefits suggest that, in the early 
stages of a system culture change, capitation is incompatible with an increased emphasis on 
prevention.  If it is used at all, it would appear apposite for purchasers to begin with either no 
or very low-power incentives, increasing the power very slowly over a very extended time 
period (up to 20 years or more may be necessary, given the long times to accrue paybacks), 
bearing in mind that each increase in strength will result in more random risk being shared 
with practitioners.  The commencing and concluding strength will also need to be lower the 
smaller the provider’s risk pool.  To do otherwise will risk a backlash against the very 
objective that the strategy sets out to achieve.   
 
The very strong incentives in the NZPHCS, and the rapidity with which they are increased, 
suggest that, despite the theoretical potential for a system prioritising prevention, the most 
likely outcome will be that the costs of risk management will rapidly crowd out any positive 
effects.  Once again, if there are changes in sectoral behaviour consistent with the strategy’s 
objectives, these are far more likely to be a function of the non-price elements of the strategy 
than the financial incentives of the capitation contracts implemented.  
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3.3.6 Reduction of Patient Moral Hazard or Increased Costs of Negligence? 
Whilst it is not explicitly stated as an objective of the strategy or a reason for the use of 
capitation, it is possible that capitation contracts may be applied as a means of inducing 
practitioners to take a more pro-active role in discouraging the anticipated increase in patient-
induced over-consumption as the number of subsidised individuals increases (Shen and 
McFeeters, 2005).  Each additional ‘worried well’ consultation provided will erode 
practitioner profits, so practitioners will presumably face incentives to identify habitual ‘well 
worriers’ and endeavour to alter their cost-causing behaviour.   
 
However, it is impossible for a practitioner to ascertain without first conducting a consultation 
whether a patient’s presenting condition is ‘well worrying’ or a more tangible illness.  Even 
habitually well worriers may sometimes present with tangible illnesses.  If the practitioner 
screens out habitual ‘well worriers’ (e.g. shorter consultations, delegating them to the nurse), 
then the practitioner runs the risk of overlooking a tangible illness.  The risk to the 
practitioner’s reputation from such an outcome is costly, so the practitioner must take this into 
account when deciding whether to discriminate between patients.  This makes the use of 
capitation contracts to induce practitioner control of consumer over-consumption problematic.  
Very strong incentives in the contract may induce over-much screening out, and higher flow-
on costs of practitioner liability for negligence.  It is also noted that the same effect may also 
ensue from lower quality in a highly-capitated system with very small pools and no ability for 
the practitioner to recoup costs.   
 
4. Conclusion 
In summary, it appears highly unlikely that the objectives of the NZPHCS will be delivered 
by a capitation instrument in the form that it has been applied since 2002.  The very strong 
incentives in the contract, the very small risk pools managing demand variation, and the 
highly unusual way in which practitioners can set the variable component mean that it is 
almost certain that the behavioural changes desired will not be induced.  If they do occur, it 
will almost certainly be as a consequence of the non-financial tools of the strategy rather than 
capitation funding.  Moreover, even if the incentive strengths had been lower, the time taken 
to implement the system longer, and a more equitable way of levying the costs not met by 
government funding devised, it is unlikely that the desired equity outcomes would have been 
achieved, given that capitation is systematically contrary to increased equity.  There is a slight 
possibility that capitation may have been able to play a small role in increasing the emphasis 
on prevention and increasing teamwork, but only if managed very carefully.  On balance, 
these objectives appear to be much more appropriately addressed by non-financial 
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instruments, and then only if it is quite clear where the locus of responsibility for the 
incentivised activity lies.  It is not at all clear that the current system, with the focus of 
capitation funding on end suppliers, will achieve the objective.  
 
Rather, the tools as implemented are far more likely to induce a very high cost, inequitable 
system with significant distortions in patient equity and significant implications for the 
allocation of human and physical capital in the sector.  The most likely outcome will be a  
rapid progression towards a bifurcated system with quality type and ownership form based 
upon patient health state.  It will also be substantially more costly to deliver each consultation 
provided, relative to the pre-2002 system, given the opportunities for windfall profits to be 
extracted. The unusual arrangements with respect to individuals paying the variable 
component and the strength of the capitation incentives, will ensure that the inequities will 
emerge much sooner, and will be much more extreme, than if the incentives had been softer, a 
single payer controlled both the fixed and variable components of the capitation payment, and 
specific attention was given to the role of risk management in the system’s design.  Evidence 
of such discrepancies are already emerging, with practitioners being bifurcated upon the basis 
of profitability and risk aversion, patients finding it increasingly difficult to find a practitioner 
willing to assume financial responsibility for their demand variation and quality differences 
emerging between providers prepared, and able, to raise patient prices and those who cannot.  
 
That such a system could have emerged appears due to the lack of clarity in the system design 
between the role of population-based funding as an insurance/risk management instrument 
and capitation contracts as a means of incentivising providers to change behaviours.  Indeed, 
the nature of insurance/risk management in population-based funding is conspicuous by its 
absence from discussion in any of NHC (2000), the papers commissioned by the National 
Health Committee for the preparation of the document, and the NZPHCS itself.  Also 
conspicuous by its absence is a discussion about the nature of supply-side risk-sharing in 
capitation contracts.  The simple interchangeability of each of budget-based funding of 
DHBs, budget-based funding of PHOs (both population-based risk management instruments) 
and capitated funding of service providers appears to be taken for granted, as is the 
interchangeability of patient payments under the pre-2002 system and patient payments under 
the NZPHCS.   
 
It does not appear that in the design of the policy the subtlety in the change of the individual 
receiving government subsidies from a sick individual receiving a treatment subsidy for ex 
post demonstrated demand to a well individual receiving an ex ante premium subsidy in 
respect of anticipated demand was identified.  Thus the change in the role of practitioners 
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from service providers pre-2002 to risk managers under the NZPHCS was neither understood 
nor fully appreciated.  Whilst the system design allowed for the creation of PHOs to assume 
the risk management role, and for PHOs to enter into customised contracts with service 
providers, which could have been of any form including fee-for-service or capitation, it is 
possible that the creation of the majority of PHOs as extensions of service providers made it 
conceptually difficult for either policy-makers or service providers to separate out the 
distinctive roles of risk management and service provision.  That neither the MoH nor the 
DHBs has experience in either managing, or purchasing risk management from, insurance 
companies probably did not assist in making the distinctions clear.   
 
Ironically, the ACC model probably provided the best template for the NZPHCS, in that it is 
(for worker payments at least) a partially subsidised population-based insurance and risk 
management system, collecting premium top-ups (worker contributions paid via payroll 
taxes) to meet costs, providing care co-ordination and management, and purchasing care from 
the same providers as the primary health care system.  If ACC was managed like the 
NZPHCS, partial premiums would be paid by employers for all employees, but the balance of 
the financial liability for care commissioned by ACC not covered by the employers would be 
collected only from those individuals unlucky enough to have an accident.  The more unlucky 
an individual was, and the more accidents he had, the more payments that individual would 
make.  Lucky individuals, however, would pay nothing.  Moreover, the payments made 
would depend upon the luck of the other individuals registered at a particular practitioner.  If 
more of them were unlucky and had accidents, then the payments made would be higher than 
at another practitioner who had fewer unlucky individuals ‘on the books’.  This would be 
considered an extremely inequitable design for ACC, as it punishes the very individuals that 
the system sets out to assist – those facing uncertain costs from having an accident - yet it is 
the design adopted for the NZPHCS, which is charged with managing the cost uncertainties 
for those who do not know what their demand for primary care will be.  The discussion in this 
paper reveals just how inequitable it can be, and moreover how significantly the management 
design can result in distortions in costs, system structures and incentives for practitioners.   
 
The analysis in this paper begs the question of whether there is room for the current system to 
be modified, so that it supports the objectives of increased government funding and increased 
(but not perfect) equity without the extreme distortions suggested in this paper as likely 
outcomes.  A first requirement must be that the system recognises that the current capitation 
payment is being required to undertake three very distinct tasks that need to be separated.  
Politically-motivated wealth redistributions are rightly part of the taxation and welfare 
system, and should be managed in that system and not be allowed to distort the allocation of 
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resources and outcomes in health care provision.  PHOs are the logical recruiters and 
registrars, as well as being the recipients of population-based budgets, and managers of the 
first levels of financial risk, but their operations should reflect this activity.  They need access 
to risk management resources and expertise.   They cannot continue to be treated as simply 
operational extensions of care providers, with boards comprised of provider representatives 
letting contracts to themselves (a significant conflict of interest), and with no requirement for 
financial or risk management representation (Howell, 2006a).  They are first and foremost 
insurers and care managers, so must be able to recoup costs directly from all insured 
individuals, as per the employee contribution of ACC, rather than just from those falling ill 
and receiving treatment from a care provider.  They are also care purchasers, so must exercise 
independence and sensitivity to individual practice circumstances when entering into 
contracts with providers.  This may include the ability to use fee-for-service contracts if this is 
appropriate.  It must be abundantly clear in the system which entities are responsible for risk 
management, and these tasks must be scrutinised with the same skills and purpose as those of 
other risk managers (e.g. insurance companies, pension funds).   
 
A robust population-based funding model is, unfortunately, not synonymous with a single 
capitation contract.  Rather, in the funding of both PHOs and service providers, it must be 
recognised that there is no one ‘ideal’ contractual model that will meet all needs.  As James 
Robinson identifies in the quote that opens this paper, if there is a single theme that this paper 
reveals, it is that remuneration systems are complex and interactive, and they involve multiple 
contracts.  When a nexus of contracts is required to deliver multiple goals, then multiple 
remuneration methods may be required.  This was James Robinson’s recommendation in 
2001.  The New Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy in operation appears to bear out, 
unfortunately through negative examples, the wisdom of this advice. 
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